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DISCOVERING CONCEALMENT:
DEFINING THE LIMITS OF
EQUITABLE TOLLING IN
SECTION 16(B) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
BORIS RAPPOPORT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is tasked with
two conflicting missions: it must protect investors and simultaneously
1
maintain the integrity and efficiency of capital markets. The SEC
protects investors by imposing a disclosure regime that reduces
2
information asymmetries between the public and corporate insiders.
Enhanced disclosure obligations, however, impose significant costs on
3
corporations. Balancing these two objectives is a delicate task, but
one that should be reflected in any judicial construction of securities
4
law. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds will require the
Supreme Court to apply this trade-off in the context of Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
any director, officer, or beneficial owner of more than ten percent of
any class of equity securities must disclose his ownership of such
securities within ten days of becoming a beneficial owner of such
5
security or within two days of any change in such ownership. Section

*

J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law.
1. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb.
20, 2012).
2. See id. (stating that investments are best protected by requiring disclosure of
information to the public).
3. See infra Part V.
4. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261 (U.S. argued Nov. 29,
2011).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(a) (West 2010).
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16(b) requires that all profits generated by the insider from the
purchase or sale of such securities within a period of less than six
6
months be disgorged back to the issuer. Moreover, the Section reads:
“[N]o such suit [under Section 16(b)] shall be brought more than two
7
years after the date such profit was realized.” Section 16(b) relies
exclusively on a private right of action by stockholders of the issuing
8
corporation. The SEC has carved out an underwriter exemption to
both disclosure under 16(a) and disgorgement under 16(b), allowing
underwriters to keep their profits from short-swing transactions when
9
acting in good faith and in the ordinary course of business.
In Credit Suisse Securities, the Supreme Court will address the
applicability of equitable tolling doctrines to Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, the Court must decide
between four distinct approaches: disclosure, actual notice, discovery,
10
and repose. Because each choice represents a significant change in
the balance of responsibilities between shareholders and insiders of a
corporation, the Court will have to look outside the factual
boundaries of the case to properly assess the policy implications of
11
each proposed alternative.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
The 1990s saw a tremendous boom in the technology sector,
generating massive speculation and tremendous opportunities for
12
raising capital in the primary markets. Technology companies took
advantage of this environment by issuing hundreds of initial public
13
offerings (IPOs). In an IPO, the investment banks that form the
underwriting syndicate determine the price of an IPO’s shares as well
as the number of shares to be issued. The banks then commit to
underwriting the transaction: purchasing the entire equity issuance at
a below-market price and subsequently distributing the securities to
6. § 16(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010)).
7. Id.
8. See id. (“Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer . . . .”).
9. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7(a) (West 2011) (creating an underwriter exemption to
Section 16(a)); see also § 240.16a(10) (applying the underwriter exemption to Section 16(b)).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See Brief for Respondent at 6–7, Credit Suisse Sec. v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261 (U.S.
Sept. 26, 2011) (discussing “hot” IPOs of the dot-com era).
13. Id. at 7.

RAPPOPORT POST-FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/27/2012 3:53 PM

DISCOVERING CONCEALMENT

173

14

the public at a higher fixed price. Critically, the issuer transfers the
offered shares onto the underwriters’ books, giving the underwriters
15
large, though temporary, stakes in the issuers’ corporations.
Because underwriters’ profits are determined by the spread
between the initial and fixed prices, they take on the risk of low
demand. In the volatile markets of the 1990s, share prices of
technology IPOs would often increase exponentially in the weeks
following the public offerings; investors who managed to get their
16
hands on hot IPO shares often made tremendous returns.
In March of 2000, the dot-com bubble burst and hundreds of
technology stocks tanked. This prompted thousands of investors to
17
file a class action lawsuit in connection with more than 300 IPOs.
18
Shareholders challenged Underwriters’ conduct under antitrust laws,
19
basing their suit on two distinct factual claims. First, the shareholders
alleged that the Underwriters would initiate frenzies by entering into
“laddering” arrangements—wherein investors were required to buy
IPO shares at increasingly higher prices in the aftermarket in order to
20
secure allocations of the IPOs. Second, shareholders alleged that the
Underwriters would receive kickbacks from investors who were
allocated shares in the early stages of an offering through “tying”
arrangements, or agreements to purchase different securities at later
21
dates. The Supreme Court dismissed these antitrust complaints,
holding that an extension of antitrust law to the facts of the IPO
22
litigation would infringe on the realm of securities regulation.
Six years later, in 2006, Respondent Vanessa Simmonds bought
shares in fifty-five of the companies subject to the earlier IPO
23
litigation. Simmonds, now a shareholder of the companies that

14. See id. (explaining how underwriters buy cheap and sell high shortly after purchase).
15. See id. at 10 (stating that, collectively, the underwriters were beneficial owners of more
than ten percent of issuer securities).
16. Id. at 7.
17. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 3, Credit
Suisse Sec., No. 10-1261 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2011).
18. The defendants in this litigation include Credit Suisse Securities (USA) and dozens of
other underwriters.
19. Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007).
20. See id. at 269–70 (noting that plaintiffs in suit were suing over “laddering”
arrangements).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 285 (“We therefore conclude that the securities laws are ‘clearly
incompatible’ with the application of the antitrust laws in this context.”).
23. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Credit Suisse Sec., No. 10-1261 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2011).
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conducted IPOs in 1999 and 2000, brought derivative suits under a
24
modified legal challenge based on nearly identical factual claims. She
alleged that the Underwriters of the IPOs were beneficial owners of
more than ten percent of company securities and profited from the
25
short-swing trading of such securities in violation of Section 16(b).
Moreover, Simmonds asserted that the Underwriters’ alleged tying
and laddering arrangements were not done in good faith and
26
therefore were not subject to the underwriter exemption. Finally,
because the Underwriters failed to report these non-exempt shortswing transactions with a Section 16(a) disclosure, Simmonds claimed
that Section 16(b)’s two-year statute of limitations should be subject
27
to equitable tolling. This final claim is at issue before the Supreme
Court.
After Simmonds settled one case out of court, the Underwriters
moved to dismiss the remaining fifty-four complaints on the ground
that the claims were time-barred, having been filed more than two
28
years after the date the profits at issue were realized. The district
29
court agreed with regard to twenty-four of the claims. According to
the district court, the two-year statute of limitations in Section 16(b)
was not tolled because Simmonds had access to all of the information
necessary to bring a claim under Section 16(b) more than two years
30
before filing suit. Therefore, the equitable tolling doctrine was
31
inapplicable. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Section 16(b)’s
statute of limitations is tolled until the Underwriters disclose their
32
transactions via a filing of Section 16(a) disclosure statements. To
33
date, no such statements have been filed.

24. See Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec., 638 F.3d 1072, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 3064 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1261) (alleging the same factual accusations of
laddering, tying, and kickbacks as were alleged against underwriters in Billing).
25. Id. at 1084.
26. Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 56, Simmonds, 638 F.3d 1072 (No. C07-1649).
27. Id. at 21–23.
28. Underwriter Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants’ Reply at 1, Simmonds, 638 F.3d
1072 (No. C07-1649).
29. In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (dismissing
the thirty remaining cases for insufficient demand).
30. Id. at 1217.
31. Id. at 1218.
32. Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1096–97.
33. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 10–11.
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III. BACKGROUND LAW
Credit Suisse Securities requires the Supreme Court to determine
if equitable tolling applies to Section 16(b)’s limitations period. If the
Court holds that Section 16(b) contains a statute of limitations subject
to equitable tolling, it will then have to determine the scope of the
34
equitable tolling doctrine in the context of Section 16(b) litigation.
Equitable tolling, a legal doctrine enumerated in Holmberg v.
35
Armbrecht, delays the running of the statute of limitations whenever
defendants have defrauded or concealed facts essential to a plaintiff’s
36
cause of action. The Supreme Court has recognized a rebuttable
presumption in favor of equitable tolling where a defendant defrauds
or misrepresents material facts, preventing a plaintiff from filing suit
37
within the statutory time limit. This rule derives from the maxim that
38
a party should not be allowed to profit from its own misconduct. In
addition, tolling is appropriate not only in cases of affirmative
misrepresentation, but also where a party’s silence breaches an
39
independent legal duty to disclose.
40
Section 16(b) is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. On the
one hand, it “imposes strict liability regardless of motive, including
41
trades not actually based on inside information.” On the other hand,
there is no liability for actual insider trading done over a period
42
longer than six months. This structure was not accidental nor a
consequence of poor drafting. Rather, it was a purposive attempt by
Congress to meet the Securities Exchange Act’s stated goal of “easy

34. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at i (framing the questions presented as
“[w]hether the two-year time limit . . . is subject to tolling, and, if so, whether tolling continues
even after the receipt of notice of facts giving rise to the action”).
35. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
36. Id. at 397.
37. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
38. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33 (1959) (“[W]e need
look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence this principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by
both law and equity courts and has frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on
statutes of limitations.” (footnote omitted)).
39. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (stating that “silence in
connection with purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud” with “such liability . . .
premised upon a duty to disclose”); see also Sprint Commc’ns v. FCC, 76 F.3d 1221, 1226 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (“Silence does toll the statute of limitations, however, if the defendant has an
affirmative duty to disclose . . . .”).
40. Dreiling v. Am. Exp. Co., 458 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2006).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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43

administration.” By providing strict bright-line rules, Congress
sought to diminish problems of proof and reduce uncertainty in
44
Section 16(b)’s application. As a result, courts have been hesitant to
45
“exceed a literal, ‘mechanical’ application of the statutory text.”
The Section’s statute of limitations reads in relevant part: “Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity . . . but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
46
profit was realized.” The statute contains no reference to a plaintiff’s
47
discovery of facts. However, given that courts are hesitant to exceed
literal interpretations of Section 16(b)’s operative provisions, it seems
plausible that they would apply such restrictive reasoning to the
language of the timing provision as well. Nonetheless, this plain
meaning interpretation of the provision has not prevented courts
from applying equitable tolling.
The Circuits are split between three equity-based approaches to
48
tolling of Section 16(b) claims. In Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., the
49
Ninth Circuit adopted a disclosure approach to equitable tolling. The
plaintiff argued that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations should be
50
tolled until a defendant files a Section 16(a) report. The court
agreed, holding that the two-year time limit did not begin to run
because the insider never disclosed the covered transaction with a
51
16(a) report. The court reasoned that Congress’s goal of limiting
insider trading would be circumscribed if an insider could simply
avoid the effects of Section 16(b) by failing to disclose the covered
52
transactions as required by Section 16(a).

43. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
44. Id.
45. Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 122 (1991) (quoting Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at
425); see also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 251 (1976) (refusing
to interpret Section 16(b) beyond its “narrowly drawn limits”); see also Kern Cnty. Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593–96 (1973) (suggesting that courts should not
interpret Section 16(b) beyond its “strict terms”).
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010).
47. Id.
48. 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1996).
49. See id. at 528–29.
50. Id. at 527.
51. Id. at 529.
52. See id. at 528 (“If insiders could insulate their transactions from the scrutiny of outside
shareholders by failing to files 16(a) reports and waiting for the two year time limit to pass, then
Congress’s creation of these shareholders’ derivative suits would be nullified.”).
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Using a different approach, the Second Circuit nevertheless came
53
to a similar conclusion in Litzler v. CC Investments, L.D.C. The court
54
began its analysis by distinguishing inquiry notice from actual notice.
Under inquiry notice, a statute of limitations will be tolled until a
reasonably diligent plaintiff has sufficient information to inquire into
55
the potential violation. A plaintiff’s knowledge of his injury,
therefore, would defeat equitable tolling. The Litzler court found,
however, that Section 16 imposes an “absolute duty” of disclosure that
56
would be strained if inquiry notice applied. Shareholders are not
supposed to piece together the relevant facts needed to bring a claim
under Section 16(b). Instead, shareholders have a justified
expectation that any information pertinent to a Section 16(b)
violation would be publicly available through a Section 16(a)
57
disclosure. Therefore, the statute should be tolled until the
shareholder or company gets “actual notice that a person subject to
Section 16(a) has realized specific short-swing profits that are worth
58
pursuing.” Actual notice, according to the court, can only be
59
triggered by compliance with Section 16(a).
The third equity-based approachthe discovery approachwas
60
enumerated in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds. According to the Merck
Court, if a defendant has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed
facts essential to the plaintiff’s case, the statute of limitations will be
tolled until a reasonably diligent plaintiff discovers or should discover
61
the facts that would form the basis of a claim. Although the filing of
a disclosure form would presumably give shareholders sufficient
information to discover Section 16(b) violations, a shareholder also
can be alerted to possible violations through alternative means, such
as pleadings filed in a previous case. Therefore, a discovery approach
dictates that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations begins to run as
53. 362 F.3d 203 (2d Cir. 2004).
54. Id. at 207–08.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 208 (quoting Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)).
57. See id. (“Section 16 compels disclosure (through a Form 4) that is so clear that an
insider’s short-swing profits will be discovered without any investigation other than the putting
together of two and two.”).
58. Id.
59. See id. (“Such tolling should continue only until the claimant or (depending on the
circumstances) the company gets actual notice that a person subject to Section 16(a) has
realized specific short-swing profits that are worth pursuing.”).
60. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1796 (2010) (holding that a discovery
approach applies to section 10(b)).
61. Id. at 1789–90.

RAPPOPORT POST-FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

178

2/27/2012 3:53 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 7

soon as shareholders should discover information that could form the
basis of a short-swing claim, whether or not that information is a
Section 16(a) disclosure.
The three equity-based rules described above stand in sharp
contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
62
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson. Although the Lampf court
acknowledged that statutes of limitations are “customarily subject to
63
tolling,” —particularly when one party is injured by the fraud of the
other and remains in ignorance of her injury—the Court found
sufficient evidence to override this traditional presumption in Section
64
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Instead, the Court held
that the statute of limitations in Section 10(b) is a period of repose—a
strict outer limit unaffected by the plaintiff’s discovery of information
65
pertinent to a potential suit. A period of repose is distinguishable
from a statute of limitations because it is totally inconsistent with
66
tolling. Although the Lampf Court did not hear arguments
67
concerning Section 16, both the majority and dissenting opinions
refer to Section 16(b)’s two-year limitations period, in dicta, as a
68
period of repose.
IV. ARGUMENTS
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments from three partiesthe
Underwriters, Simmonds, and, writing in support of neither party, the
United States. The Underwriters claim that Section 16(b) contains a
69
period of repose not subject to tolling. Simmonds, applying the
disclosure approach, contends that the statute of limitations in Section
70
16(b) should be tolled until the filing of a Section 16(a) report. The
United States, arguing for the application of the discovery approach,
asserts that Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations should be tolled only

62. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
63. Id. at 363 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (citations
omitted)).
64. Id.
65. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 16–19; see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that tolling is inconsistent with statutes of repose
because “their very purpose is to set an outer limit unaffected by what the plaintiff knows”).
66. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
67. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note
17, at 28 n.7 (“Section 16(b) was not at issue in Lampf . . . .”).
68. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360 n.5; id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, passim.
70. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, passim.
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until a reasonably diligent investor knows or should know about the
71
Section 16(b) violation.
A. Underwriters’ Plea for Repose
The Lampf Court characterized Section 16(b)’s statute of
72
limitations, in dicta, as a period of repose. In fact, the majority
opinion noted that the two-year time limit is a “more restrictive”
73
period then the three-year period imposed by Section 10(b).
Therefore, the Underwriters argue that Lampf provides direct
support for the proposition that equitable tolling does not apply to
74
Section 16(b). The Underwriters then turn to the language of Section
16(b), to similar provisions in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
75
and to the structure of the 1934 Act to bolster their argument.
The Underwriters assert that Section 16(b) contains the language
76
of a traditional statute of repose. They contend that there is no
meaningful distinction between the limiting language of Section
16(b)“[n]o such suit shall be brought more than two years after the
date” and the outer limits of two companion limitation provisions
in the Exchange Act that have been characterized by the Lampf
77
Court as statutes of repose.
Moreover, the Underwriters claim that because Section 16(b) and
the companion provisions are contemporaneously enacted provisions
78
of the same statute, they should be interpreted in a similar fashion.
This cohesive reading of the provisions is supported by the policy
justification underlying each of the sections. The Lampf Court stated
that both Section 10(b) and the companion provisions were intended
to “facilitate a central goal: ‘to protect investors against manipulation
of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities

71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
passim.
72. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
73. Id. at 360 n.5.
74. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 2 (“Indeed, by reference to these companion
provisions, this Court already has characterized Section 16(b)’s time limit as a ‘period of repose’
that cannot be extended.” (quoting Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360 n.5)).
75. Id. at 16, 18–21.
76. Id. at 16, 20–21.
77. Id. at 20–21. These Sections, 9(e) and 18(c) (hereafter the “companion provisions”),
read in relevant part: “[N]o action shall be maintained to enforce any liability . . . unless
brought . . . within three years after such violation.”
78. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 20 (quoting Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359).
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79

exchanges.’” Because Section 16(b) was also implemented to protect
investors against insiders’ manipulation of stock prices, it should be
80
interpreted consistently with the companion provisions. Accordingly,
the Underwriters argue that Section 16(b) should be construed as a
81
statute of repose.
The Petitioners then juxtapose the single structure of Section
16(b)’s statute of limitations to the two-part structure of the
82
companion provisions’ statutes of limitations. Section 9 reads: “An
action may be brought . . . within one year after the discovery of the
facts constituting a violation and within three years after such
83
violation.” This dual-structure “underscores that Congress knew
perfectly well how to link a time limit to the plaintiff’s ‘discovery’ [of
84
pertinent facts].” Nonetheless, Congress avoided adopting discoveryspecific language for Section 16(b) and, instead, tied the running of
the statute of limitations to the date on which short-swing profits
85
were realized.
The lack of a general discovery rule in Section 16(b) highlights
another issue with Simmonds’ petition for equitable relief: although
discovery rules traditionally lengthen the period in which a plaintiff
can bring suit, the limited discovery rules in the companion provisions
86
shorten the limitations period from three years to one year. This
suggests that Congress intended discovery rules to act as restrictions
on statutory time limits in the Securities Exchange Act. The
Underwriters argue, therefore, that where Congress implements an
explicit discovery rule to shorten a statute of limitations, a court
should not read an implicit discovery rule into a neighboring section
87
of the same statute in order to extend a limitations period.

79. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360–61 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976)).
80. See Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading,
Release No. 34-18114, 46 Fed. Reg. 48147-01, at 48147 (Oct. 1, 1981) (finding that Congress
enacted Section 16 to prevent insiders from manipulating the price of company stock).
81. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, passim.
82. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 19–21 (“The juxtaposition of a ‘discovery’
time limit with an outer time limit in Sections 9(e) and 18(c) also shows that the outer time limit
of these dual-structure provisions is a period of repose that cannot be extended, regardless of
when the plaintiff discovers a claim.”).
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C.A § 78i(f) (West 2010).
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 19.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id. at 22.
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The Underwriters also note that the companion provisions involve
intentional violations of securities law. Section 16(b), however, is a
88
strict liability provision carrying no scienter requirement. In fact,
Section 16(b) does not prohibit insiders from engaging in short-swing
transactions; it merely forces disgorgement of profits in covered
89
transactions. The Underwriters maintain that it would seem
counterintuitive to assume that Congress intended to allow repose in
cases of intentional fraud (as the Court had done in Lampf), yet deny
repose to insiders who were unknowingly violating the technical
90
requirements of Section 16(b).
B. Absolute Disclosure: Simmonds’ Argument for Equitable Tolling
Simmonds argues that the Underwriters’ failure to disclose
transactions covered under Section 16(a) is a breach of an affirmative
91
duty of disclosure that tolls the statute of limitations. Moreover,
relying on both Whittaker and Litzler, Simmonds contends that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the filing of a Section
16(a) disclosure because Congress’s purpose of “curb[ing] insider
92
trading” requires the imposition of an “absolute duty” of disclosure.
1. Rebutting the Underwriters’ Arguments for Repose
First, Simmonds attempts to show that the text of Section 16(b)
more closely resembles a traditional statute of limitations rather than
93
a period of repose. Periods of repose often focus on the elimination
94
of the underlying right rather than the suit’s timeliness. Section
16(b), however, does not address the loss of a corporation’s right to
95
short-swing profits.

88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 22–23.
89. Id. at 23; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West
2010).
90. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 23.
91. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 24–26 (implying that the absolute duty to
disclose gives rise to tolling).
92. Id. at 23–26.
93. Id. at 18.
94. Id. For example, the statute of limitations in § 1635(f) of the Truth in Lending Act
reads in relevant part that the “right of rescission shall expire three years after the date . . . .”
95. Id.; see also Donald C. Cook & Myer Feldman, Insider Trading under the Securities
Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 413 (1953) (“The two-year statute of limitations in
Section 16(b) is not a condition of the right to action. It is merely a limitation upon bringing . . .
suits . . . .”).
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Next, Simmonds argues that the Underwriters’ reliance on Lampf
96
is misplaced. The Lampf Court did not emphasize the precise
wording of the relevant provisions in deciding whether Section 10(b)’s
time limitation was a statute of repose. Instead, when rebutting the
standard presumption against equitable tolling, the Lampf majority
gave particular consideration to the structure of the companion
provisions: “[T]he equitable tolling doctrine is fundamentally
97
inconsistent with the 1-and-3-year structure.” According to the
Court, the inner one-year limit already provides for the discovery of
facts by the plaintiff, thereby making discovery-based tolling
98
superfluous. As a result, the three-year term serves as a strict outer
limitas a period of repose not subject to tollingonly because of its
99
relationship to the one-year inner limit. The companion provisions
already provide for the application of a discovery rule, the three-year
time limit does not need to be extended in order to afford additional
100
101
time for discovery.
Section 16(b) lacks this dual structure.
Therefore, the key to the majority’s reasoning in Lampf for overriding
the traditional presumption for equitable tolling is not present in this
102
case.
More importantly, Section 16(b) was never at issue in Lampf; the
characterization of Section 16(b) as a period of repose is merely dicta.
In fact, Lampf explicitly rejected any analogy between Section 10(b)
and Section 16(b), refusing to adopt Section 16(b)’s time limitation
103
because of its differing focus and alternative means of punishment.
Therefore, the Court has implicitly acknowledged that Section 16(b)
should be evaluated on its own terms.
Finally, Simmonds claims that the legislative history of Section 16
supports a narrow interpretation of the provision. Congress
96. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 28.
97. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
at 26–27.
101. Id. at 27; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West
2010).
102. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note
17, at 27 (arguing that the Lampf Court “did not suggest that the presumption for equitable
tolling is generally inapplicable to limitations periods contained in the securities law”).
103. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 28; see also Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360 n.5
(“Because that provision [Section 16(b)] requires the disgorgement of unlawful profits and
differs in focus from § 10(b) and from the other express causes of action, we do not find § 16(b)
to be an appropriate source from which to borrow a limitations period here.”).
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specifically rejected a repose approach when drafting Section 16. In
the first draft of the House bill, Congress considered a dual-structure
approach similar to that of the companion provisions, drafting the
following language: “No such suit shall be brought more than six
months after such profit was realized if the facts upon which such suit
was based were disclosed . . . or more than three years after such
105
profit was realized if the facts were not disclosed.” This language
106
was subsequently deleted.
“[F]ew principles of statutory
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress
does not intend sub silento to enact statutory language that it has
107
earlier discarded.” In fact, rather than foreclosing the application of
equitable remedies to Section 16(b), Congress specifically reinforced
the presumption of equitable tolling by explicitly providing for the
operation of equitable remedies: suit to recover short-swing profits
108
“may be instituted at law or in equity.”
2. A Conjunctive Reading of Section 16
Simmonds further argues that Section 16(b) should be interpreted
109
in conjunction with Section 16(a). Such an interpretation would
provide the necessary link between the cause of action provided by
Section 16(b) and the disclosure of the covered transaction under
Section 16(a). Because the cause of action depends on the disclosure,
the running of the statute of limitations should also depend on the
110
disclosure of the covered transaction.
To prove this connection, Simmonds asserts that Congress
“grammatically” linked Section 16(b)’s time limit to its counterpart
111
provision, Section 16(a): “[N]o such suit [under Section 16(b)] shall

104. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 29–30.
105. Id. at 29 (quoting H.R. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 73RD
CONG., SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL 45 (Subcomm. Print Apr. 18, 1934)).
106. See H.R. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 73RD CONG., SECURITIES
EXCHANGE BILL 45 (Subcomm. Print Apr. 26, 1934).
107. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 30–31 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987)).
108. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010) (emphasis
added).
109. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 5 (“[Section 16(a) reports] ‘are an integral
part of the context of § 16 within which § 16(b) must be read.’” (quoting Whittaker v. Whittaker
Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 (9th Cir. 1981))).
110. See id. at 22 (“Underwriters’ no-tolling construction ignores [Section 16(a)’s disclosure
requirement].”).
111. Id. at 20 (quoting ARNOLD JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
§ 1:1 (2012)).
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be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
112
realized.” “Such profit” refers to profits realized by the “beneficial
113
owner, director, officer” defined in Section 16(a)(1). Under Section
16(a)(3), such statutory insiders must disclose their purchase or sale
of “equity securities of such issuer of which the filing person is the
114
beneficial owner.” Therefore, the operation of Section 16(b)’s
statute of limitations presumes that Section 16(a) profits will be
115
disclosed.
Furthermore, Simmonds argues that the underlying rationale for
Section 16 would be thwarted if insiders could escape liability under
Section 16(b) by not properly reporting transactions under Section
116
16(a). Section 16(b) works only by imposing an “absolute duty” of
117
disclosure upon insiders subject to Section 16(a). A failure to
disclose a transaction under Section 16(a) would, therefore, effectively
insulate insiders from Section 16(b) liability.
Simmonds supports this absolute duty requirement by turning to
the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. When
drafting Section 16(b), Congress was concerned with correcting the
118
asymmetry of information between insiders and other shareholders.
The legislative history details several incidents where insiders with
advanced knowledge of material information bought and sold
securities of the issuerof which they were a beneficial ownerfor
119
purposes of personal gain. Some insiders went so far as to
manipulate the market price of their own company’s securities in
120
order to obtain short-swing profits. Section 16, however, was not
121
meant to punish insider short-swing transactions. Instead, Congress
created a prophylactic incentive structure intended to prevent future

112. § 16(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (West 2010)) (emphasis added).
113. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 21.
114. § 16(a)(3)(A) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(3)(A) (West 2010)).
115. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 21.
116. Id. at 45–46; Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 (9th Cir. 1981).
117. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 26; Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d
203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004).
118. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976)
(“Congress recognized that insiders may have access to information about their corporations
not available to the rest of the investing public.”).
119. Interpretive Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, 46 Fed.
Reg. 48147-01, at 48147 (Oct. 1, 1981) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 241).
120. Id.
121. See Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 689 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[Section 16(b)] is
meant to prevent, rather than to cure what has already happened.”).
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122

opportunistic behavior. The two subsections of Section 16 depend
123
on one another to properly implement this incentive scheme.
Section 16(a) requires directors, officers, and stockholders who
own more than ten percent of a company’s stock to disclose the
amount of equity security that they currently hold, as well as any
change in ownership of company stock within two business days of
124
their purchase or sale of such stock. Such persons lose some of their
time-sensitive informational advantage by revealing to the market,
within a period of two days, their reassessment of the value of their
125
own company. Consequently, Section 16(a) acts as a deterrent to
insiders’ potential abuses by allowing market mechanisms to limit the
effect of insiders’ opportunistic behavior.
Employing similar deterrent effects, Section 16(b) allows
shareholders to force disgorgement of any beneficiary’s profits made
from the purchase or sale of the beneficiary company’s security within
126
127
a period of six months. This is a strict liability provision. The
disgorgement remedy of Section 16(b) is prophylactic: it does not
punish past insider short-swing transactions. Instead, it is intended to
prevent future manipulative trading by taking away any incentive to
128
manipulate share prices. A prophylactic scheme, by definition, can
only work effectively if insiders are properly disincentivized from
violating the relevant provision: “[I]f s 16(b) is to have the ‘optimum
prophylactic effect’ which its architects intended, insiders must not be
129
permitted so easily to circumvent its broad mandate.”

122. Id.; Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 51617 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding that Section 16(b) acts
as a deterrent).
123. See Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The prophylaxis of
Section 16 works by imposing an ‘absolute duty’ of disclosure upon insiders . . . .” (quoting
Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947))).
124. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(a) (West 2010).
125. See Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
that the purpose of Section 16 is to deter insiders from taking advantage of confidential
information).
126. § 16(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (West 2010)).
127. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) (“The objective
standard of Section 16(b) imposes strict liability upon substantially all transactions occurring
within the statutory time period, regardless of the intent of the insider or the existence of actual
speculation.”).
128. See Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 689 (2d Cir. 1975) (“In so interpreting
‘beneficial owner’ we are not ‘adding’ to the prophylactic effect Congress itself clearly
prescribed in [§] 16(b).”).
129. Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 432 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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This prophylactic scheme, claims Simmonds, must ensure that
130
insiders are not afforded easy opportunities to evade the law. It
must therefore provide sufficient deterrents against the violation of
the relevant provision. Section 16(b) provides this deterrent through a
nearly automatic application and “disclosure . . . that is so clear that an
insider’s short-swing profits will be discovered without any
131
investigation other than the putting together of two and two.” It
requires a bright-line determination of insider short-swing trading,
based on strict liability, that is both over-inclusive and under132
inclusive. Given the difficulties involved in uncovering evidence of
insider trading, Section 16(b) can only ensure the adequate protection
of shareholdersand by negative implication, adequate deterrence of
insidersby providing for an “absolute duty” to file Section 16(a)
reports. To do so would tie the running of the statute of limitations to
133
the disclosure of the covered transaction. Unless an “absolute duty”
is imposed, Simmonds asserts that insiders will be able to circumvent
the application of Section 16(b) by failing to disclose their short-swing
134
transactions and then watching the statute of limitations run.
Congress’s intention to impose an “absolute duty” of disclosure
explains why it implemented an exclusively private enforcement

130. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 26.
131. Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Blau v. Lamb, 363
F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[Section 16(b)’s] success as a deterrent was rooted in its simplicity
and relatively automatic operation . . . .”).
132. See Dreiling v. Am. Exp. Co., 458 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The statute imposes
strict liability on insiders only for ‘shortswing’ trades . . . . Courts have recognized that § 16(b) is
a blunt instrument, at once both over- and under-inclusive.”).
133. See Litzler, 363 F.3d at 208 (“The prophylaxis of Section 16 . . . would be impaired if
the tolling triggered by non-compliance was ended or defeated by mere inquiry notice, or by
circumstances in which a person would or should have realized the non-compliance, or by the
ability of a shareholder or company to piece together the substance of a Form 4 from disparate
sources of information.”); see also Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
(“The short space of time within which the action must be brought under Section 16(b) is
intelligible only when read in the context of an absolute duty to make prompt and frequent
reports.”).
134. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 24–26; see also Whittaker v. Whittaker
Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(“[I]t would be a simple matter for the unscrupulous to avoid the salutary effect of Section 16(b)
which provides a remedy for the recovery of short term profits, simply by failing to file monthly
reports in violation of subdivision (a) and thereby concealing from prospective plaintiffs the
information which they would need to adequately protect their interests.”); Marc I. Steinberg &
Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 59 (1992) (“To permit an insider
to violate section 16(a) by neglecting its filing obligation and thereby avoid section 16(b)
liability . . . conflicts with the congressional objective of deterring insider abuse . . . .”).
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135

mechanism for Section 16(b) while expressly creating a public
136
enforcement mechanism for Section 16(a). Under the intended
incentive scheme of an “absolute duty” to disclose, the government
guarantees the disclosure of all necessary information under Section
137
16(a), leaving shareholders holding the reins only with regard to the
enforcement mechanism of Section 16(b). Because all shareholders
are presumed to have access to information regarding insider’s short138
swing profits, the enforcement mechanism becomes so easy for a
private individual to administer that there is no need for the
unnecessary expenditure of public resources. Only if shareholders are
entitled to rely on an expectation that all inside transactions are
public information will the court effectuate Congress’s intent and give
investors confidence that they have sufficient protection under the
current legal regime. Adequate protection can only be achieved by
enforcing the principle of absolute disclosure.
C. Limiting Principles: Arguments for the Application of a Discovery
Rule
Arguing for neither side, the United States Government occupies
a middle ground between the positions of Simmonds and the
Underwriters. Analogizing to arguments advanced by the Supreme
139
Court in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, the United States maintains that
equity does not necessarily require tolling of the limitations period
140
until after the filing of a Section 16(a) report. Although such a filing
would start the running of the statute of limitations, it is not the only
141
triggering scenario. Rather, the equitable tolling exemption should
apply in cases of fraud or concealment until the “litigant first knows
or with due diligence should know facts that will form the basis for an
142
action.” Section 16(b)’s statute of limitations, therefore, begins to
run whenever a reasonable plaintiff should discover the facts
143
necessary to bring a short-swing claim.
.

135 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.A § 78p(b) (West 2010).
136. Id. at § 16(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) (West 2010)).
137. See Cook & Feldman, supra note 95, at 414 (arguing that if there is no disclosure under
Section 16(a), shareholders are not charged with adequate notice of the transaction).
138. Id.
139. 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).
140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
at 19–24.
141. Id. at 20–21.
142. Id. at 19 (quoting Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1794).
143. Id.
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Equitable tolling is an exception to the general limitations rule,
applying whenever a defendant’s fraudulent conduct prevents a
144
plaintiff from “even knowing that he or she had been defrauded.”
Only where the plaintiffwithout any want of diligence on his
partremains in ignorance of the fraud committed upon him, does
the statute of limitations continue to be tolled. If, on the other hand,
the plaintiff knows of the defendant’s activities and sleeps on his
145
rights, he should not be permitted to bring suit. The United States
argues that the appellate court’s application of the Whittaker standard
(that tolling does not begin to run until the filing of a Section 16(a)
disclosure) is therefore inconsistent with the correct background
146
rule. Instead, the appellate court should have determined whether
Simmonds actually discovered, or whether a reasonable security
holder should have discovered, the facts underlying the short-swing
147
claim.
V. ANALYSIS
Application of equitable tolling rules in this case will require the
Supreme Court to carefully balance the rights and responsibilities of
shareholders and insiders. The Underwriters’ argument presents
significant problems in this regard. A repose approach would
interpret Section 16(b) narrowly, conforming to judicial precedent
148
favoring literal interpretations of strict liability provisions.
Congress’s imposition of strict liability, however, was intended to
“squeeze all possible profits out of a stock transactions [sic], and thus
to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the
selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the
149
faithful performance of his duty.” Allowing the two-year limitations
period to run when a shareholder does not or should not know of the

144. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1793.
145. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
at 21–22.
146. Id. at 21.
147. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
at 21; see also Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1798 (holding that the limitations period begins to run when
the plaintiff discovers, or when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, the facts
constituting the violation).
148. See, e.g., Gollust v. Mendel, 501 U.S. 115, 122 (1991). Because Section 16(b) imposes
strict liability without fault, courts are reluctant to extend the scope of Section 16(b) liability,
even in situations that would fall within the evils that Congress attempted to curb.
149. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943) (assuming this to be
Congress’s intention).
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covered transaction would defeat Section 16(b)’s core prophylactic
purpose by allowing the statute of limitations to run in cases of
150
blatant fraud. Moreover, a repose approach would task shareholders
with actively investigating all corporate insiders, or risk losing their
right to bring suit in federal court.
A disclosure or actual notice rule lacks the flaws of the repose
approach and reaffirms the bond between the two subsections of
151
Section 16. A disclosure or actual notice rule would effectuate the
prophylactic nature of the statute and ensure that covered insider
short-swing transactions “will be discovered without any investigation
152
other than the putting together of two and two.” Disclosure or
actual notice would create a strict, mechanical, and bright-line statute
of limitations that would not begin to run until the filing of a Section
16(a) disclosure.
Such an approach, however, greatly skews the proper balance of
responsibilities between insiders and shareholdersbetween
disclosure and investigationshifting too much responsibility onto
the former. When debating statutes of limitations in the Securities
Exchange Act, Congress worried that “lingering liabilities would
153
disrupt normal business and facilitate false claims.” Statutes of
limitation are intended to limit the period of liability for old
transactions, preventing a Sword of Damocles from indefinitely
154
hanging over a potential wrongdoer’s head. Both disclosure and
actual notice approaches create exactly this kind of indefinite
155
liability. If insiders can be held liable decades after the completion
of the covered transaction, there is a risk of significant chilling effects
156
that would deter individuals from serving on boards of directors. In
order to ameliorate the effects of this harsh rule, policy considerations
dictate that shareholders, though not required to thoroughly

150. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
at 30.
151. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 46 (arguing that Section 16(b) requires
enforcement requires Section 16(a) disclosure).
152. Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2004).
153. Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 1993).
154. Id.
155. See In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (finding
that Simmonds’ theory of liability provided no demarcated boundaries, nor did it provide any
end date of liability).
156. See Brief of Chamber of Com. of the U.S. and Sec. Industr. and Fin. Markets Ass’n as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1112, Credit Suisse Sec. v. Simmonds, No. 10-1261
(U.S. Aug. 25, 2011) (noting that Senator Kean describes indefinite liability as “blackmail”).
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investigate possible infringements of Section 16(b), should at least be
expected to avail themselves of public information.
Where all relevant information about covered transactions has
become public, there are no practical justifications for allowing the
continued tolling of a statute of limitations. Accordingly, adopting a
discovery rule instead of a disclosure rule will not place an onerous
burden on investors. Under the discovery approach, failure to disclose
a Section 16 transaction will toll the statute of limitation: the
purposeful concealment of the covered transaction, preventing a
shareholder from discovering the short-swing profit, clearly falls
157
within the ambit of Holmberg v. Ambrecht’s discovery rule. In the
present case, however, where shareholders had access to all facts
necessary to constitute a Section 16(b) violation at least five years
before the filing their claim, insiders should be entitled to expect a
158
certain level of repose.
This case highlights that a bright-line disclosure rule is too blunt
an instrument for determining when a statute of limitations should
begin to run. Rather, courts should determine whether a reasonable
shareholder, through reasonable diligence, could have discovered the
159
information needed to bring suit. This discovery rule will best
balance the interests of all parties involved; the markets will have
confidence that there is sufficient disclosure of insider trading,
insiders will not fear unlimited liability, and plaintiffs will have
sufficient time to uncover the facts necessary to bring their claims to
court.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the facts of this case illustrate that investors will still be
able to rely on the sufficiency of an insider’s disclosures without a
judicially imposed “absolute duty” to disclose. Therefore, the Court
should adopt the discovery rule, reversing the Ninth Circuit and
barring all twenty-four complaints on the ground that they were
brought more than two years after the date that a reasonably diligent

157. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 17,
at 7–8; see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (holding that equity tolls a
statute when a defendant has concealed facts essential to the plaintiff’s claim).
158. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, note 17, at
7–8 (arguing that the statute of limitations should begin to run when information has come to
light in ways other than through a section 16(a) disclosure).
159. Id.
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shareholder discovered or should have discovered the facts that
would form the basis of a Section 16(b) short-swing claim.

